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ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION-PROBLEM
CHILD OF THE LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently the much discussed but seldom litigated issue
concerning the legal effect of human conception by artificial
insemination was presented before a court of this country
for consideration. 1  Artificial insemination, commonly re-
ferred to as Al, is the introduction of semen into the female
reproductive tract by mechanical means in order to effect
pregnancy 2 AI is of two types: (1) Homologous arti-
ficial insemination, usually called AIH, uses the seminal
fluid of the husband injected by mechanical means into his
wife to induce conception and (2) Heterologous artificial
insemination, generally known as AID, using the seed of a
third party donor in a similar manner s AIH is normally
free from legal complications since only husband and wife
are involved and the child is the biological product of his
lawfully-wedded parents. 4  AID, however, is surrounded
by an entanglement of possible legal difficulties due to the
entrance of the third-party donor into the picture. Thus
the remainder of this note will concentrate on a discussion
of AID.
Al is not an extremely recent development. It was
first practiced on a human being in England in 1799 and
the first recorded successful AIH in the United States was
accomplished in 1866.5 AID appears to have its beginnings
in the early 20th century 6 During the 1930's hundreds of
pregnancies were reported to have been effected by Al.
7
Although it is difficult to gauge accurately the extent to
which AI has been used, the conclusion has been drawn
that it has increased enormously in the last twenty years
both in the United States and in Europe.8
1. Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. 1963). Child was held not to
be legitimate issue, see snfra note 38.
2. 32 WASH. L. REv. 280 (1957).
3. Rice, AID-An Heir of Controversy, 34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 510, 511 (1959).
4. 30 N.Y. L. R v. 1016 (1955).
5. Rice, supra note 3, at 511.
6. Rice, supra note 3, at 511.
7. Holloway, Artificial Insemination An Examination of The Lega4 Aspects,
43 A.B.A.J. 1089, 1090 (1957).
8. Rice, supra note 3, at 512.
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Due to the secrecy normally surrounding the use of AI,
generalities and statistics are of less than usual reliability 1
It has been estimated that 1000 to 1200 babies are conceived
by AI in the United States each year and that there are
50,000 to 100,000 AI individuals living in this country today 10
Since ten percent of the couples of child bearing age are
childless and twenty-five to forty percent of them are child-
less because of the husband's incapacity, an ideal situation
for the use of AID is presented because adoption is often
an inadequate or impossible means of obtaining children."
If the use of AID should increase, or even, as one writer
put it, if the practice should stop immediately, serious legal
problems arise because of what has already been done. 1 2  A
few of the problems which might be encountered are:
(1) Does AID constitute adultery on the part of the mother
or third party donor) (2) Is the child conceived by AID legiti-
mate? (3) What are the inheritance rights of such a child?
(4) What obligations for support and rights to custody are
incurred by the donor and the husband of the child's mother 9
There is no statutory law either permitting or denying
the right to resort to AID and the legality of AID has not
been decided in the cases dealing with this subject. 13  Stat-
utes dealing with AID have been proposed in at least six
states but none has been enacted.1 4  This lack of legislation
forces the courts to apply indirectly-related law to solve
problems presented by AID and often produces unsatisfac-
tory results.
II. ADULTERY
Whether or not the mother is guilty of adultery is the
issue raised most often by the few cases which have in-
volved the use of AID. In considering the matter of adultery,
two separate actions must be recognized, one being a crimi-
9. Rice, supra note 3, at 511.
10. Seymour and Koerner, Artifical Insemination, Present Status in the United
States as Shown by a Recent Survey, 116 J. AmER. MED. AssN. 2747 (1941).
11. Hager, Artificial Insemination Some Practical Considerations For Effec-
tive Counseling, 39 N.C.L. REV. 217 (1961).
12. 28 IND. L.J. 620 (1953).
13. Levisohn, Dilemma In Parenthood Socio-Legal Aspects Of Human Arti-
ficial Insemination, 36 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1, 18 (1959).
14. Rice, supra note 3, at 520.
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nal prosecution for the crime of adultery and the other a
civil action for divorce.
Adultery at common law was not an indictable offense
but was left to the ecclesiastical courts for punishment as
a sin due to sexual connection between a man and woman
of whom one at least was married to a third person. 15
Adultery in modern law has generally been made a criminal
act by statute, punishable by fine or imprisonment.' Thus
the nature and elements of the offense of adultery depend
primarily on the definition of the crime provided by statute
or adopted by the courts in the absence of statutory defini-
tion. Courts have held that adultery has no technical
meaning in the law aside from that used in the ordinary
and popular sense, 17 but that the gist of adultery is voluntary
sexual intercourse by a married person with any other person
not his or her wife or husband. 8  If either the mother or
married donor involved in AID were to be prosecuted for
adultery under this definition it is difficult to comprehend
how either party could be convicted of the crime. AID is
mechanical and involves no actual connection of the sexual
organs of the donor and the mother, nor actual penetration
into the body of the latter which is generally considered
sexual intercourse as required by the courts. 19  Even by
criminal statute voluntary sexual intercourse is required for
adultery, thus AID would not seem to qualify 20 S t r i c t
interpretation required of criminal statutes has precluded
varying the definition of adultery to include anything but
sexual intercourse as defined by the courts. An unmarried
donor would also be relieved from prosecution for the offense
of adultery, as provided by some statutes, due to the lack
of sexual intercourse in AID 21
All of the cases which have involved AID and adultery
have been decided in the divorce courts of various juris-
dictions. The first case ever litigated dealing directly with
AID was Orford v Orford, a Canadian case, which held
15. State v. Hasty, 121 Ia. 507, 96 N.W 1115 (1903).
16. Ex Parte Rocha, 30 F.2d 823, 824 (S.D. Tex. 1929).
17. State v. Hart, 30 N.D. 368, 152 N.W 672, 673 (1915).
18. Commonwealth v. Moon, 151 Pa. Super. 555, 30 A.2d 704, 708 (1943).
19. Williams v. State, 92 Fla. 125, 109 So. 305, 306 (1926).
20. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-09 (1960).
21. Ibsd.
1964]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
that AID performed on the wife without knowledge of the
husband was adultery on her part and denied her petition
for alimony on that basis.2 2  In that case the court rejected
the necessity of sexual intercourse and held that adultery
is committed by any act which involves the possibility of
introducing into the family of the husband a false strain
of blood. 23 The court further concluded that the essence
of adultery was the invasion of the marital rights of the hus-
band or wife. 24  An American case with facts similar to
the Orford case came to a contrary conclusion in dicta say-
ing that if the wife had proven her contention that she had
submitted to AID, and had not committed adultery in the
normal way, she could not be divorced. 2  The nearest
American case decided squarely on the question of AID
and adultery was decided in 1954 wherein the court followed
the Orford case saying that AID, with the consent of the
husband, was contrary to public policy, good morals, and
was adultery on the part of the wife.2 6  It would appear
that as between the two cases holding AID as adultery the
Orford case is more acceptable because of the lack of con-
sent by the husband.
The election of some courts to hold that AID is adultery
seems to be based on the proposition that there is no re-
quirement that divorce statutes be strictly construed, thus
the mere possibility of a bastard child is sufficient grounds
for divorce. 27  Some statutes providing for adultery as
grounds for divorce include in the definition of adultery the
element of voluntary sexual intercourse. 28  The mechanical
nature of AID has no resemblance to sexual intercourse
so it would seem very difficult even under liberal inter-
pretation to obtain a divorce for AID as adultery under such
a definition.
22. Orford v. Orford, 49 ONT. L.R. 15, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921), hereinafter
referred to as the Orford case.
23. Id. at 258.
24. Id. at 258.
25. Hoch v. Hoch, Civil No. 44-C-9307, Cir. Ct. Cook County I1. (1948) for
discussion see Rice, AID-An Heir of Controversy, 34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 510, 514
Levisohn, Dilemma In Parenthood Socio-Legal Aspects Of Human Artificial
Insemination, 36 Cm-1-KENT L. R:v. 1, 23 (1959).
26. Doornbos v. Doornbos, Civil No. 54-S-14981, Super. Ct. Cook County iMi.,
Dec. 13, 1954 for discussion see Rice, AID-An Heir Of Controversy, 34 NOTRE
DAME LAW 510, 514 (1959) Levisohn Dilemma In Parenthood Socio-Legal
Aspects Of Human Artificial Insemination 36 C I.-KENT L. REV. 1, 23 (1959).
27. Tallin, Artificial Insemination, 34 CAN. B. REv. 1, 18-19 (1956).
28. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-04 (1960).
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As a practical matter it is difficult for the husband to
obtain a divorce on the grounds that AID is adultery on
the part of the wife because rules of evidence prohibit testi-
mony by a husband or wife as to non-access which would
bastardize a child.29  Some cases, however, have tended
to admit such evidence when adultery alone is at issue and
resulting illegitimacy of a child only incidental.30  The wife
may also have a good defense to the husband's action by
i n t r o d u c i n g evidence of condonation by the husband-1 or
possible connivance 32 if the husband had consented to AID.
If the reasoning of the courts holding AID as adultery
is followed some unsatisfactory results might occur A don-
or's semen can now be preserved for about two years,3 3 thus
it is possible for the mother to be impregnated after the
donor is dead in which case she would have to be convicted
of adultery with a dead man. If the seed of the husband
and donor is mixed the result would have the wife commit-
ting adultery with her husband. Despite all the reasons
for holding the contrary, some authorities have expressed
no doubt but that AID is adultery on the part of both mar-
ried donor and married recipient.3 4  It would seem that
the better approach would bypass adultery and treat AID as
the new genus that it is.
III. LEGITIMACY
The problem of legitimacy of the child is one of the
most perplexing presented by mechanical conception. This
problem has been met directly in two reported American
cases. Strnad v Strnad, the first such case, involved the
visitation rights of a husband with regard to a child con-
ceived by AID prior to divorce of the wife from the
husband. 35  The court therein decided that even though
the child was not of the blood of the husband he was po-
29. Goodright ex dem. Stevens v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257
(1777) Annot. 4 A.L.R.2d 567 (1949).
30. Koffman v. Koffman, 193 Mass. 593, 79 N.E. 780 (190-7).
31. Beck v. Beck, 120 N.W.2d 585 (Neb. 1963), Ross v. Ross, 119 N.W.2d
495 (Neb. 1963).
32. Dennis v. Dennis, 68 Conn. 136, 36 At. 34 (1896).
3. Tallin, supra note 27, at 6.
34. ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY'S COMMISSION ON ARTIFICIAL
INSEMINATION, REPORT ON ARTIFICIAL HUMAN INSEMINATION, 37
(London, 1948) as referred to in 40 N.C. L. Rv. 111 (1961).
35. Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1948), hereinafter
referred to as the Strnad case.
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tentially adopted or semi-adopted by the husband who would
be entitled to the same rights as a foster parent who had
adopted the child.3 6  In its opinion the court expressly
stated that a child conceived by AID is as legitimate as
a child born out of wedlock who is made legitimate upon
marriage of the interested parties.37  Gursky v Gursky,
the most recent case dealing with AID, also involved the
legitimacy of a child so begotten.3 8  Although the case was
decided in the same state as Strnad the court came to
the opposite conclusion. Reasoning that since the legisla-
ture has declined to modify the concept of illegitimacy, a
child conceived by AID is logically illegitimate since he
is begotten by a father other than the husband of his
mother -9 In this case the court distinguishes the Strnad
case by stating that the holding in the earlier case was
not supported by authority, and the conclusion of the court
therein that the child was potentially adopted recognized il-
legitimacy by implication.
4 °
The Gursky case followed the general rule making a
child illegitimate which has been begotten by one other
than the husband of the mother 4 1  Declaring a child
illegitimate under this rule is difficult under the law as it
now stands, since one of the strongest presumptions in the
law is that a child born in wedlock is legitimate.42  This
presumption, it has been reasoned, is rebutted only by evi-
dence of non-access or complete absence of the husband
when the child must have been conceived. 43  Courts which
still strictly follow the rule, as stated by Lord Mansfield,
prohibit the parents of a child from giving evidence to these
matters if such evidence would tend to bastardize the child.
44
These courts would very probably disallow a husband's
testimony as to the performance of AID on his wife since
such evidence would often tend to show non-access, an ele-
ment necessary to rebut the presumption of legitimacy
36. Id. at 391.
37. Id. at 392.
38. Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. 1963).
39. Id. at 409, Accord, State v. Coliton, 73 N.D. 582, 17 N.W.2d 546, 549
(1945).
40. Supra note 38, at 411.
41. State v. Coliton, 73 N.D. 582, 17 N.W.2d 546, 549 (1945).
42. Demilio v. New York State Thruway Authority 235 N.Y.S.2d 642, 651
(N.Y. 1962).
43. Lanford v. Lanford, 377 P.2d 115, 116 (Colo. 1962).
44. Goodright ex dem Stevens v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, 98 ENG. REP. 1257 (1777).
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One court, when confronted with conflicting evidence as
to conception by AID, followed this rule in stating that the
presumption of legitimacy was not overcome, and conse-
quently denied the mother's right to testify as to conception
by AID 45
Some courts when confronted with the problem of legiti-
macy and AID may well have less difficulty in admitting
evidence of non-access. The rule prohibiting such testimony
has been severely criticized by competent authorty46 and
some courts have relaxed the effect of the presumption by
admitting evidence. These courts feel that the presump-
tion is merely rebuttable if disputed by the husband or wife
or descendant of either, thus allowing illegitimacy to be
proven like any other fact.4 7  Courts have held recently
that where all parties agree that a child is not of the hus-
band the presumption of legitimacy has been overcome.
48
Considering these later cases, which seem to be the modern
trend, the difficulty of overcoming the presumption is being
removed at least in some jurisdictions. The relaxation of
Lord Mansfield's rule allows greater facility in the admit-
tance of evidence of AID, thus permitting a child so con-
ceived to be declared illegitimate with greater ease.
The law will declare a child legitimate if after its il-
legitimate birth his parents marry 49 It would seem then
that even the direct authority of the Strnad case cannot be
relied on since marriage of merely interested parties would
be ineffective for legitimation. In order to accomplish the
desired result it would seem necessary for the mother and
donor to marry
Until the enactment of legislation it would seem that
the only means available to parents with children conceived
by AID, to insure their legitimacy, would be formal adoption
according to statute. Lack of action may deprive the child
of any legal father since, due to the secrecy of AID, the donor
and the mother are usually unknown to each other
45. OhIson v. Ohison, No. 53-S-1410, Super. Ct. Cook County Ill. (1954) for
discussion see 8 U. FLA. L. REv. 304, 309 (1959).
46. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2063-2064 (3d ed. 1940.).
47. Supra note 41, at 548.
48. Kucera v. Kucera, 117 N.W.2d 810, 814 (N.D. 1962).
49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-02 (1960).
1964]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
IV RIGHTS OF INHERITANCE
Courts, when confronted with the problem of legitimacy
of an AID child, have expressly refused to pass on any
personal rights, including inheritance rights, of that child.5°
Though the problems of AID have not frequently been
litigated there is some case law on the problems of adultery
and legitimacy If the courts must ever decide directly
on inheritance rights they will have to apply existing law
in the absence of specific legislation on the rights of an
AID child. The question of the AID child's right to inherit
by will is practically non-existant since statutes provide that
a testamentary disposition may be made to any person
having legal capacity 51 A real problem arises regarding
the child's inheritance rights and who can inherit from the
child.
If the theory of the Strnad case is followed it w o u 1 d
seem that there would be very little problem so far as
intestate inheritance by the AID child is concerned. In that
case the court considered the child potentially adopted or
semi-adopted and legitimated by marriage of the interested
parties.5 2  Carrying this reasoning to its logical conclusion
it would seem that the child would be entitled to all the
rights of an ordinary legitimate, and property could pass
to and from him by intestate succession as provided by
statute.
5 3
If the AID child is declared illegitimate, or made so by
a ruling that AID is adultery, it is apparently necessary
in the absence of legislation to apply the ordinary laws of
intestacy The rule at common law was that a bastard
was "the son of nobody" and could not inherit property or
transmit his estate, should he die intestate, to anyone but
his lineal issue.54  This rule applied to both the father and
mother of the illegitimate child.55  Most states have modi-
fied this strict common law rule by expressly allowing the
50. Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 412 (N.Y. 1963).
51. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-05 (1960).
52. Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390, 391 (1948).
53. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-04 (1960).
54. In Re Klingaman, 128 A.2d 311, 312 (1956) In Re Paterson's Estate, 34
Cal. App. 2d 305, 93 P.2d 825, 828 (1939).
55. In Re Kuenzle's Estate, 219 Minn. 176, 17 N.W.2d 309, 312 (1944).
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mother to inherit from the child,56 as well as allowing the
child to inherit from and through his mother 57 Applying
the law just stated the AID child would be allowed to inherit
only from his mother since the husband is not the legal
father
Some statutes would allow an AID child that has been
held illegitimate to inherit from the donor, who is technically
his legal father, just as if the child had been born in wed-
lock.58  As a practical matter, however, such inheritance
is impossible in AID since the donor usually remains anony-
mous.
The donor father, assuming he could be determined, by
common law could not inherit from his illegitimate child
upon the latter's dying intestate.5 9  Statutes abrogating the
common law prohibition usually condition the father's in-
heritance on acknowledgement or recognition of the illegiti-
mate child as his own. 6 0  The anonymity of AID, however,
prevents this acknowledgement.
The safe course for the parents of a child conceived by
AID would again seem to be formal adoption, thus establish-
ing his right to inherit as a lineal descendant from his only
known father as well as from his mother 61 Adoption can
be had without consent of the father of an illegitimate by
most statutes, making a determination of the donor's identity
unnecessary 62
V CUSTODY AND SUPPORT
Whether the third-party donor or the husband must support
a child conceived by AID is a matter not directly decided
by any court where both the donor and the husband were
involved. However, in the Gursky case, though the child
was declared illegitimate, the husband was ordered to furnish
support on the theory of equitable estoppel and implied
contract. The duty thus imposed rested on the fact the
56. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-06 (1960).
57. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-05 (1960).
58. Ibid.
59. State v. Chavez, 42 N.M. 569, 82 P.2d 900 (1938).
60. Ex rel. Thompson, 224 La. 995, 71 So. 2d 544 (1954).
61. Hoellinger v. Moizhon, 77 N.D. 108, 41 N.W.2d 217, 220 (1950), In Re
Berg's Estate, 72 N.D. 52, 4 N.W.2d 575, 577 (1942).
62. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-11-04 (1960).
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husband gave his consent to the performance of AID and
that he treated the child as his own.
6 3
In the absence of the equitable estoppel doctrine used
in the Gursky case it would be difficult to hold the husband
liable for support under existing statutes. When the AID
child is held illegitimate the husband is under no duty to
support him. This duty could be placed on the donor, as
actual father of the child, by statutes64 generally in force
changing the common law rule which did not impose such
a duty 65 If the donor should fail to carry out this duty,
assuming of course he can be identified, the mother would
have a legal cause of action against him. This action first
would establish paternity of the donor,66 which is not neces-
sary if he acknowledged fatherhood, 67 then would force
support 5 under penalty of contempt of court 9.6  Because
the same donor is frequently employed for a number of
inseminations, the duty of support which might be placed
upon him could be oppressive
°.7
The holding of the Strnad case, if followed, declaring
the child legitimate or adopted, would place the duty of
support definitely on the husband in the same manner as
he would be required to support any legitimate issue.
7 1
The problem of custody of the AID child would not
generally arise under the Strnad case since if the child
were declared legitimate the husband would be entitld to
custody 72 Under the Gursky case a problem of custody
might arise only if the mother would die, since statutes
generally entitle the mother of an illegitimate to primary
custody 73 On death of the mother, courts have held that
the putative father has superior rights to custody of the child.
74
63. Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 412 (N.Y. 1963).
64. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-36-03 (1960).
65. State v. Tieman, 32 Wash. 294, 73 Pac. 375, 376 (1903).
66. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-36-09 (1960) State v. Coliton, 73 N.D. 582, 17
N.W.2d 546 (1945).
67. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-36-04 (1960).
68. Ibid.
69. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-36-25 (1960').
70. O'Rahilly, Artificial Insemination, Medical Aspects, 34 U. DET. L.J. 383,
386 (1957).
71. Bismarck Hospital and Deaconesses Home v. Harris, 68 N.D. 374, 280
N.W 423 (1938)
72. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-04 (1960).
73. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05 (1960).
74. Ex rel. Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 P.2d 888 (1954)
[Vol. 40
This holding, however, is generally qualified by the courts
when they require that the father be a suitable person,'7 5 and
by the fact that cases as well as statutes require the best
interests of the child to be the primary consideration in
any custody proceeding. 6 Considering especially the latter
qualification it becomes apparent that the husband would
be entitled to custody as against the donor in an AID situa-
tion since the husband has provided the home and care
for the child whereas the donor, although the legal father,
is a stranger to the child.
VI. CONCLUSION
Solutions for the problems discussed herein have been
introduced for enactment by statute in several states but
none of these have been adopted. The bill introduced in
Minnesota would have made AI unlawful but would have
legitimitized children which resulted therefrom.7 7  The
statute proposed in New York would have made the child
legitimate having all the rights and subject to all duties of
that relationship, but conditioned this legitimization on the
express or implied consent of the husband to AID.78
It would appear that some legislation is necessary since,
as has already been seen, existing law does not always
provide satisfactory results to the special situation surround-
ing AID. Any statute which might be proposed should be
concerned with the problems already discussed and, in
addition thereto, the duties and responsibilities of the doctor
administering AID The moral and social conflicts of
AID, once more firmly resolved, could furnish a guide for
the courts and legislatures to follow in settling disputes of
this nature.
DAVID T DEMARS
75. Ex rel. Human v. Hyman, 164 Pa. Super. 64, 63 A.2d 447 (1949).
76. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-10-06 (1960) , In re Wagner, 84 N.W.2d 587 (N.D..
1957).
77. Levisohn, Dilemma In Parenthood Socio-Legal Aspects of Human Arti-
ficial Insemination, 36 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 1, 29 (1959).
78. Artificial Insemisnation-The Legal Viewpoint, 32 SYRACUSE L. REV. 108,
109 (1957).
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